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Make-or-Break During Production: Shedding Light on Change-Orders, 
Rework and Contractors Margin in Construction  
 
Abstract 
A total of 98 construction projects with a combined value of $8.5 billion were examined to explore 
the nature and value of rework and change-RUGHUVDQGWKHLULQIOXHQFHRQDFRQWUDFWRU¶VPDUJLQ
Only 65% of projects experienced a cost increase during their construction, though a mean rework 
cost of 0.39% of the contracted value was incurredZKLFKKDGDQHJDWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHFRQWUDFWRU¶V
overall margin. In addition, the difference between approved client change-orders and those by the 
contractor for subcontractors was 0.5% of the total costs incurred for the sampled projects, which 
had an adverse impact RQ WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V SURILW 7KH XSVKRW KHUH is that the contracting 
organisation underwent a mean loss in profit of 23% per annum over the period of analysis. It is 
suggested that margin losses might well have been higher as rework was seldom formally 
documented and reported.  
 
Keywords: Construction, change-orders, FRQWUDFWRU¶Vmargin, rework 
 
Introduction 
³<HVWHUGD\LVQRWRXUVWRUHFRYHUEXWWRPRUURZLVRXUVWRZLQRUORVH´/\QGRQ%-RKQVRQ. 
 
Delivering construction projects within their budgeted cost remains a major challenge as change-
orders and rework are inevitable, despite every effort to mitigate their occurrence (Ahiaga-Dagbui 
et al., 2017). Not all construction projects experience an increase in their production costs, as 
changes-orders can also result in decreases to the Original Contract Value (OCV) (Ahsan and 
Gunawan, 2010; Love et al., 2018a).  However, there is a general perception that construction 
projects are repeatedly confronted with cost increases during their delivery, particularly those 
procured by the public sector (Love et al., 2017a; Invernizzi et al., 2018). This view has often been 
exaggerated and sensationalised by the media, opposition political parties, and even dubious 
academic research (Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018). 
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For example, Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) claimed that nine out of ten transport infrastructure projects 
(e.g., roads, rails and bridges) experienced cost overruns. This claim, it is contended, is at best a 
gross exaggeration. Indeed, its close examination reveals a different story that has gone 
uncontested: it was based on an unrepresentative sample and predominantly secondary and 
fundamentally flawed data (Love and Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018). Still, many academics and journalists 
continue to promote this misleading claim (e.g., Shane et al., 2009; Jaffe, 2013). Markedly, 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) did not focus on mega-projects per se, as their sample includes projects 
ranging in value from US$1.5 million to US$8.5 billion. The number of projects exceeding the $1 
billion threshold, which has been traditionally used to define a mega-project, was not specified. 
Yet, despite these flaws, Flyvbjerg et al¶V(2002) study has been heralded not only as a ³FODVVLFLQ
PHJDSURMHFWPDQDJHPHQW´)O\YEMHUJDQG7XUQHU), but also as the seminal work to illustrate 
that mega-projects consistently exceed their budgets. ,UUHVSHFWLYHRIDSURMHFW¶VVL]HLHGROODU
terms), they can, however, be subjected to cost increases or decreases. This variability has been 
overlooked by studies that have examined the cost performance of infrastructure projects. The 
upshot, however, has been that emphasis is placed solely on cost overruns.  
 
'HILQLWLRQVRIFRVWRYHUUXQVYDU\DQGDUHGHSHQGHQWRQWKHVSHFLILFSRLQWVLQWLPHRYHUDSURMHFW¶V
life that is used to calculate their occurrence (Brookes et al., 2017; Invernizzi et al., 2018; Love 
and Ahiaga-Dagbui, 2018). The corollary, for example, is that any cost overrun that is calibrated 
between the decision-to-build and the completion of construction (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002) would 
be greater than those that measure from contract award to completion of construction (Jahren and 
Ashe, 1991; Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2014). Furthermore, there is a tendency for stakeholders 
to vary in their view of what constitutes a cost overrun, though there has been a paucity of empirical 
research outlining these differing positions in the extant literature (Invernizzi et al., 2018).   
 
By and large, the dominant point of view taken to examine the cost performance of infrastructure 
projects presented in the literature is that of the public-sector client (e.g., Jahren and Ash, 1991; 
Bhargava et al., 2010; Anastasopoulos et al., 2014; Baccarini and Love, 2014; Love et al., 2018a). 
Moreover, most studies on infrastructure project cost performance focus on secondary data and 
questionnaire surveys (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg and Sunstein, 2016). Very few 
authors have attempted to study project cost performance from a main FRQWUDFWRU¶VSHUVSHFWLYH. 
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Even rare are empirical studies that have investigated the influence of change-orders1 and rework2 
on the cost performance and margin3 of a contractor, not to mention with real project data. One 
notable exception is the work of Love et al. (2017a) who examined cost performance from a 
FRQWUDFWRU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHwith a particular focus on the impact of change-orders and rework on 
their margin.  There has, however, been limited empirical research that has examined the influence 
of change-orders and rework on the cost performance of contractors during the production process 
of construction. This research paper fills this void, and uses data derived from 98 construction 
projects delivered by a main contractor with a combined value of $8.5 billion to examine the nature 
of change-RUGHUVDQGUHZRUNFRVWVDQGWKHLULQIOXHQFHRQWKHFRQWUDFWRU¶VPDrgin. 
 
The significance and relevance of this research are threefold. First, it aims to replicate the work 
and findings of Love et al. (2017a) and as such contributes to the literature at a time when there is 
an unprecedented level of concern about the reliability of research findings and a resulting crisis 
of confidence in engineering, management, and science4 (e.g., Pasher and Wagenmakers, 2012; 
Baker and Penny, 2016; Bergh et al., 2017; Fanelli, 2018). Second, it offers unprecedented insights 
not only into change-orders and rework, but also on their actual impact on cost performance and 
the margin of a contractor. Indeed, a lack of transparency generally prevails in relation to the 
margins of contractors and, as a rule, access to this type of data is restricted due to commercial 
sensitivity (NAO, 2013). And third, the paper sheds light on the subtle nuances that influence cost 
performance and margin of a contractor, supported with empirical data. Indeed, the decreases and 
increases in costs due to change-orders during construction and their financial impact on 
contractors have been, by and large, downplayed as there has been an overwhelming focus on 
FOLHQWV¶ exceeding their budgets, especially those from the public-sector (Love et al., 2017a).  
                                                 
1
 A change-RUGHULVW\SLFDOO\DFOLHQWRUWKHLUUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶VZULWWHQLQVWUXFWLRQWRDFRQWUDFWRULVVued after the signature of a construction contract, 
which authorizes a change to the work being undertaken and thus to the contract time and/or amount (Love et al., 2017a). 
 
2
 'HILQHGDVWKH³XQQHFHVVDU\HIIRUWRIUH-doing an activity or process that was iQFRUUHFWO\LPSOHPHQWHGWKHILUVWWLPH´/RYHS.  
 
3
 'HILQHGDV³DQDPRXQWRUSURSRUWLRQDGGHGIRUSURILWDQGDGGLWLRQDORYHUKHDGFRVWVLQFOXGLQJDGPLQLVWUDWLRQVXSHUYLVLRQHVtablishment 
and attendance costs) incurred solely as a result of a variation, but not including any overhead costs relating to delay, disruption or interference 
FDXVHGE\WKHYDULDWLRQ´7R]HU:p.49).  
 
4
 Reproducibility has been a core mechanism used to help establish the validity and importance of scientific findings since Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society was established in 1665 (Allison et al., 2018).  Progress is made within a field based upon a foundation of reliable 
results with reproducibility being core. Therefore, the replication of studies forms an integral part of science and is needed for the advancement of 
knowledge. The process of replication involves a study to be repeated using the same methods, different subjects, and experimenters.  Replication, 
therefore, is important for a number of reasons, which include to: (1) provide assurance that results previously obtained are valid and reliable; (2) 
determine their generalisability or the role of extraneous variables that have been examined; (3) apply the results to real world situations (e.g., to 
practice work); and (4) identify new research directions in consideration of previous findings from similar studies (Heffner, 2016). 
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The paper commences with a brief review of cost performance literature in construction to provide 
a contextual backdrop for the research that is presented. This subject matter has received a 
considerable amount of attention over several decades and includes the works of Jahren and Ash 
(1991), Hinze et al. (1992), Odeck, (2004), Siemiatycki (2009), Bhargava et al. (2010); 
Anastasopoulos et al. (2014), Ahiaga-Dagbui et al. (2017), and Callegari et al. (2018) to name just 
a few. 
 
An Overview of Cost Performance  
Cost performance is generally defined as the value of the work to be completed compared to the 
actual cost of progress made on the project (Baccarini and Love, 2014). For the clients who 
construct on a regularly basis such as the public sector, the ability to reliably predict the final cost 
of construction and ensure it does not experience an overrun is paramount for ensuring the planning 
and resourcing of other projects or those in the pipeline. Cost overrun is defined here as the ratio 
of the actual final costs of the project to the estimate made at full funds authorisation measured in 
escalation-adjusted terms (Merrow, 2011). In this instance, an overrun is treated as the margin 
between the authorised initial project cost and the real final cost incurred after adjusting for 
expenditures due to escalation terms. Thus, cost increases during the design phase are 
accommodated in this case, but their determination and consideration has received limited 
attention (Welde and Odeck, 2017). 
 
The variability between an elemental cost plan and final tender sum can range IURPíDQG
+16% (Adafin et al., 2015). It has been widely documented that changes in client/stakeholder 
requirements, design changes and the paucity of accurate information for reliable cost estimating 
GXULQJDSURMHFW¶V IURQW-end contribute to cost growth (Adafin et al., 2016; Welde and Odeck, 
2017).  Estimates that are undertaken during the design process are only as good as the information 
that they are based upon (Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith, 2014). In general, it has been assumed that 
the accuracy level of an estimate increases as more information becomes available and tenders are 
sought from contractors (Love et al., 2017a,b).  Then again, according to Aibinu and Pascoe (2008) 
the pre-tender estimates of Quantity Surveyors (QS) are often higher than the tenders received as 
material prices tend to be over-estimated and the scale of works to be more complex inasmuch as 
DSURMHFW¶Vsize is judged to be large. Though, it needs to be clear that Aibinu and Pascoe (2008) 
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did not define the meanng of µlarge¶ in the context of their study. In providing an explanation for 
the differences between pre-tender estimates prepared by a QS on behalf of a client and 
FRQWUDFWRU¶V WHQGHU, Akintoye (2000) has suggested this variance materialises for a number of 
reasons which include prevailing market conditions (e.g., availability of skilled-labour and 
inflation), changes to legislation, method of construction, and site conditions. 
 
Cost Performance in Production 
)RUFRQWUDFWRUVWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIDSURMHFW¶VFRVWSHUIRUPDQFHFRPPHQFHVIURPDFRQWUDFW¶V
award to the completion of construction works and the issue of certificate of practical completion.  
When a contractor engages with a Public Private Partnership (PPP), the measurement and 
management of cost may continue to operations and maintenance of an asset (Liu et al., 2018). 
7KLVKDVOHGIRUDFDOOIRUWKHWUDGLWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYHRIDSURMHFW¶VWHPSRUDOLW\WREHUH-defined to 
incorporate the longevity of PPPs and large-scale infrastructure works (Brookes et al., 2017; 
Alexander, 2018). In this case, focusing solely on construction cost only provides a snapshot in 
WLPH DERXW D SURMHFW¶V SHUIRUPDQFH (Anastasopoulos et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2018). Publicly 
available and published cost information for the operation and maintenance phases of PPPs are 
rarely, if at all, made accessible. 
 
Using the contract award as an anchor and using data provided by a public-sector client, Thurgood 
et al. (1990) examined cost overruns rates for 817 projects constructed between 1980 to 1989. 
They found that cost overrun rates were below 5% until 1984, and then the proportion of projects 
exceeding this amount from 1984 to 1988 increased. This increase was attributable to having less 
experienced pre-construction staff employed due to staff retiring. Similarly, Hinze et al. (1992) 
reported a mean cost overrun for roads constructed to be approximately 5%.  
 
Love (2002) found that cost overruns from the final tender sum to completion of construction for 
a sample 169 building projects to possess a mean cost overrun of 12.6%. Rework was found to 
account for 52% of the cost overrun that was incurred in the projects, though this figure included 
approved changer-orders that required work to be re-done during construction. Additionally, Love 
(2002) revealed that cost overruns and rework did not vary by project type, contract size and 
contract type. This finding, however, is in stark contrast to Forcarda et al. (2017) who examined 
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788 incidents occurring across 40 projects by a contractor and found rework costs varied between 
building and civil engineering projects (i.e. project type), private and public-sector clients and 
those delivered by a joint venture or sole contractor (i.e. contract type). The actual mean rework 
cost per project borne by the contractor was found to be RIDSURMHFW¶VOCV. 
 
Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith (2014) examined 1,600 water projects from a public-sector client and 
found an average cost overrun of 16.75%. Similarly, Baccarini and Love (2014) study of 228 
Australian sewer and water projects revealed a slightly lower mean cost overrun of 13.58%. 
Confirming /RYH¶VILQGLQJ%DFFDULQLDQG/RYHdemonstrated that cost overruns did 
not vary in their magnitude with project type, contract size and contract type. To understand the 
changing nature of costs, the cost profiles of 1,093 water infrastructure projects that were delivered 
by a water utility company were examined by Love et al. (2018a). Cost overruns were experienced 
in 656 projects. Only one project was delivered on budget with the remaining 436 being completed 
under WKHLUµ)LQDO%XGJHW$SSURYDO¶0ean cost overrun and underrun of +19.97% and -32%, were 
found, respectively. In line with previous studies, Love et al. (2018a) also UHYHDOHGWKDWDSURMHFW¶V
type and size did not influence cost performance. 
 
Using cost data from 67 projects from contract award provided by a contractor, Love et al. (2017a) 
found a series of overruns/underruns was experienced. The analysis revealed that the cost 
SHUIRUPDQFHRISURMHFWVUDQJHGIURPíWRZLWKDPHDQFRVWRYHUUXQRI 
Love et al. (2017a) were provided with the margins (excluding overheads) that the contractor had 
allocated for each project at the award of contract, which ranged from 8.76% to 10.61% with a 
mean of 9.89%. Furthermore, Love et al. (2017a) H[DPLQHG WKH LQIOXHQFH RI D SURMHFW¶V
characteristics on their cost performance and found that project and contract types, as well as their 
size, did not vary. The study did reveal that change-orders accounted for a significant proportion 
of the cost overruns that emerged in the projects, with a mean of 10.6% of OCV being reported. 
Surprisingly VLJQLILFDQW GLIIHUHQFHV ZHUH IRXQG WR RFFXU EHWZHHQ D SURMHFW¶V VL]H DQG the 
magnitude of change-orders that were issued; that is, those with a smaller OCV experienced a 
smaller amount of change-orders.  
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Love et al. (2017b) found the actual costs expressed as a percentage of the contract value for 16 
rail projects constructed by a contractor ranged from -4.19% to 96.73%, with a mean of 23%. 
Contracts that provide a traditional lump price experienced a mean cost increase of 11%. However, 
rail projects procured using a cost reimbursement (also referred to as cost-plus) form of contract 
incurred a mean cost increase of 75%. In all the projects sampled, cost increases were attributable 
to change-orders. Reimbursement contracts or management contracting are used when 
performance, quality or delivery time is a much higher concern than cost, and there is a need for 
flexibility, allowing for changes in specifications to made.   
 
In this paper, the influence of change-orders aQG UHZRUN RQ D FRQWUDFWRU¶V PDUJLQ during the 
production of an asset are examined. Besides the study undertaken by Love et al. (2017a) the 
LQIOXHQFHRIUHZRUNRQDFRQWUDFWRU¶VPDUJLQ has remained unexplored. Contractors are well aware 
of the negative impacts of rework, but they are often considered to form a part of normal operations 
or simply ignored or even concealed (Love et al., 2018b). Rework is therefore µXQFRPIRUWDEOH
NQRZOHGJH¶5 for contractors, which has contributed to their ignorance, especially as there is a 
general unwillingness to measure and proactively manage its occurrence during construction. 
Nonetheless, rework has been repeatedly identified as being a chronic problem within construction 
that stymies project and organisational performance (Forcarda et al., 2017), but more seriously is 
a major contributor to safety incidents/accidents (Wanberg et al., 2013; Love et al., 2018b). So, to 
further understand and create much-needed NQRZOHGJH DERXW WKH µPDNH-or-EUHDN¶ issues that 
influence production costs and the subsequent performance of contractors, Love et al¶VD
study is replicated, albeit within the confines of data accessibility. 
 
Case Study 
Acknowledging that there has been limited research on the influence of change-orders and rework 
RQFRVWSHUIRUPDQFHDQGFRQWUDFWRU¶VPDUJLQDWWHQWLRQ is drawn to Love et al. (2017a), who used 
case study approach to examine these issues. Therefore, in line with Love et al. (2017a), an 
                                                 
5
 8QFRPIRUWDEOHNQRZOHGJHLV³that knowledge which is in tension or outright contradiction with those versions [and] must be expunged´5D\QHU
2012: p.107). Four strategies to deal with uncomfortable knowledge are: (1) denial ± there is not a problem; (2) dismissal ± it is a minor problem; 
(3) diversion ± I am working on it; and (4) displacement - the model we have developed tells us that real progress is being achieved. In this case, 
the focus is on denial. 
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exploration to acquire an understanding of the nature of major production costs that influence 
project performance is undertaken using a case study. Yin (1984) defined a case study approach 
³DVDQHPSLULFDOLQTXLU\WKDWLQYHVWLJDWHVDFRQWHPSRUDU\SKHQRPHnon within its real-life context; 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
PXOWLSOHVRXUFHVRIHYLGHQFHDUHXVHG´S,QWKLVUHVHDUFK, an illustrative case study is used to 
describe an event or in this case utilise one or two instances to demonstrate the reality of a situation 
such as change-orders, rework DQG WKH LPSDFWRQD FRQWUDFWRU¶VPDUJLQ (Fry et al., 1999). An 
illustrative case study aims WR PDNH WKH µXQIDPLOLDU IDPLOLDU¶ and promulgate meaning to a 
problem. The process of replication in this research required a homogenous data-set to be obtained 
(i.e. in terms of processes, technologies, procedures and processes) from a contractor that had 
constructed projects of a similar nature and time period presented in Love et al. (2017a). 
 
Case Selection 
Due to the specific data requirements (e.g. similar size projects, time frame, and data availability) 
that were needed to ensure replication, purposive sampling of a homogenous nature was required 
(Patton, 2015). Homogenous sampling aims to obtain a sample where the unit of study (e.g., cases) 
shares the same (or very similar) characteristics to others. The case study organisation selected for 
this study became aware of the study reported in Love et al. (2017a) and recognising that rework 
was a problem they volunteered to engage with the research and provide access to a similar sample 
of projects that they had implemented. The researchers had previously collaborated with the 
contracting organisation on a number of earlier studies and therefore were familiar with their 
processes, procedures and staff. As a consequence, access to cost and quality data were provided 
to the researchers for analysis with commercial confidentiality being ensured. 
 
Dataset 
$FFHVVWRWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶Vproject cost data from 2009 to 2015 was provided. The 
time period of the analysis in Love et al. (2017a) was 2011 to 2014 and was restricted to public 
sector projects. From a total of 346 projects made available by the contractor, only 98 had a similar 
profile to those presented in Love et al. (2017a) in terms of their project size (i.e. value in dollar6 
                                                 
6
 Costs reported are in Australian Dollars.  
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terms) and had their rework costs available, which were based on non-conformance reports 
(NCRs) issued during construction. In addition, projects in excess of $500 million were excluded, 
as Love et al. (2017a) did not examine projects of this size. After reviewing the distribution of 
OCVs, the following categorisation was adopted: (1) <$50 million; (2) $51- $100 million; (3) 
$101-$150 million; (4) $151-$200 million; and (5) > $200 million. While the intention was to 
replicate Love et al. (2017a)¶V study, some data was not made available (e.g. actual margin). Thus, 
a direct comparison is not possible, but the data does provide additional insights particularly the 
adverse consequences of rework on margin. 
 
The dataset comprised of a mixture of public and private sector projects. It should be noted that 
the contractor was financially responsible for the rework that incurred in the projects sampled. 
Akin to Love et al. (2017a), rework in this case ZDVGHILQHGDV³DQDFWLRQRQDQRQ-conforming 
SURGXFWWRPDNHLWFRQIRUPWRUHTXLUHPHQWV´ There may have been instances where these costs 
were the responsibility of a subcontractor and monies were back-charged to them for the rework 
that occurred, but the researchers were not privy to this data, except in the case of approved change-
orders. 
 
The cost data provided included the OCV, final contract value, expected margin, client and 
contractor approved variations, and rework costs. The full detailed information of client approved 
change-orders was only available for 67 of the 98 of the projects. To ensure parity between the 
two sets of change-orders, those approved by the contractor were reduced to 67. Supplementary 
reports such aVµILQDQFLDODVVXUDQFHUHYLHZV¶ DQGµSURMHFWUHYLHZV¶ZHUHPDGHDYDLODEOHWRSURYLGH
a context for the costs that were incurred. Data relating to NCRs was also provided to enable an 
understanding of the rework costs that were incurred. Informal discussions with managers involved 
with the organisation were undertaken on a weekly basis over a three-month period while the data 
collection and analysis were being undertaken. 
 
Analysis  
Descriptive statistics are used to provide an overview of the change-orders, rework and margins 
that were incurred in the sampled projects. 3HDUVRQ¶VFRUUHODWLRQFRHIILFLHQWVwere computed to 
determine the strength of linear association between the following project characteristics: (1) client 
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type; (2) project type; (3) contract type; (4) project size; (5) cost difference % (i.e. difference 
between OCV and final contract value); (6) margin %; and (7) client approved changes-orders %. 
In addition, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was undertaken with the sample of 
construction projects to determine whether there were any statistically significant differences 
between their mean cost of rework, change-orders, and margins for different clients, project and 
contract types, and project size. In essence, an ANOVA was used so that findings could be 
compared with Love et al. (2017a) and other rework studies such as Hwang et al. (2009) and 
Forcada et al. (2017). To determine if project characteristics were SUHGLFWRUVRIWKHFRQWUDFWRU¶V
cost performance, a forward stepwise regression was performed. 
 
Results 
A total of 98 projects were analysed that equates to $8.5 billion worth of construction works (Table 
1). The projects were implemented throughout Australia, and their location has been concealed to 
prevent them from being identified. Private and public-sector projects accounted for 46 and 52 
projects of the sample, respectively. The mean value of projects awarded to the contractor was 
approximately $87 million with the minimum and maximum being $690,565 and $484 millions, 
respectively. It was revealed that 35 (33.3%) projects did not experience a cost increase from the 
award of a contract, and one project was delivered less than the contracted value.  
 
Table 1. Summary of total costs for the sample of projects 
 
Factors Mean ($) Std. Dev.($) Min.($) Max.($) Total ($) 
Cost of projects 
at contract award 
87,294 800 19,962,612 690,565 483,764,036 8,554,890,525 
 
Rework (cost) 248,287 129,0690 - 12,561,056 
 
24,332,181 
Client approved 
change-orders 
46,313,387 999,669 -12,941,360 31,030,218 310,302,961 
Subcontractor 
change orders 
5,325,973 551,292 -14,163,083 102,250,903 356,840,218 
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Rework costs were directly borne by the contractor in 93% of projects. To reiterate, change-order 
data that had been approved by clients was only available for 67 of the 98 projects sampled7. 
Change-orders accounted for 3.6% of the total value of contracts that were awarded. Change-
orders, for example, required by a public-sector client during construction resulted in an 
overwhelming cost increase of $310 millions to a project (Table 1). 
 
Subcontractor change-orders which are works approved by the contractor were almost $357 
million. It can be seen from Table 1 that ~$46 million worth of additional works needed to be 
accommodated by the contractor. When this sum and rework (i.e. ~$25 millions) are combined, a 
staggering ~$71 millions was forfeited by performing unplanned work. The mean yearly profit for 
the contractor over the six-year period of analysis was $51 millions. Thus, a mean loss $11.8 
millions (~23%) of profit was forgone from these 98 projects alone. Considering that these projects 
only constituted 25% of the total delivered during the period of analysis, it is suggested that this 
loss in profit may, in fact, be an underestimate, especially as data to determine the difference 
between client and contractor approved change-orders for 29 projects were missing.   
 
The descriptive statistics for the cost factors that have been the focus of this study are presented in 
Table 2. The mean cost difference was revealed to be 81.29% and the median 4.36%. Two projects 
experienced significant cost increases from the OCV to the final contract value (FCV), as can be 
observed in Figure 1.  
 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics for cost factors 
 
Factors Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Variance 
Margin % 0.00 32.33 7.56 6.43 41.39 
Rework %  0.00 12.32 0.39 1.35 1.81 
Change-order %  -1627.43 323.13 -35.73 270.41 73124.16 
Cost difference %  -0.76 3353.89 81.29 448.82 201439.70 
 
The maximum cost overrun was in excess of 3000% for a building project that was procured using 
a design and construct contract. Context is important here and understanding the nature of the 
contracting strategy that is put in place and agreed between client and contractor requires 
                                                 
7
 Again, data pertaining to rework that arose due to changes-orders and design omissions was not made available for this study. 
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consideration. Though, there has been a proclivity for previous studies that have examined cost 
performance of projects to dismiss the importance of contracting strategies that are used to deliver 
projects (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg and Sustein, 2016). In the case at hand, tKHSURMHFW¶V
OCV was $848,000 and the final contract value was $29.2 millions and 12.32% rework were 
experienced. At face value, a cost overrun may be assumed, but this was not the case. This was a 
private sector project that initiated some miscellaneous works and then relied on an addendum to 
the contract to fit-out the entire building. While the percentage of rework is the highest of the 
sample as a proportion of OCV, accounting for $104,000 no change-orders were formally issued. 
If rework costs were based on the FCV then they would have been 0.35%, which is below the 
mean of 0.39%, but greater than the median of 0.04%. 
 
The other outlier project identified in Figure 1 with cost increase in excess of a 2900% increase 
was associated with a rail system constructed to transport iron ore from a mine to a port facility. 
The project used construct only contract with an OCV of $1.2 million and a FCV of approximately 
$36.69 millions$JDLQFRQWH[WLVQHHGHGWRXQGHUVWDQGZK\WKHSURMHFW¶VFRVWLQFUHDVHGE\VXFK
a significant amount. The project in question was constructed in a remote location (i.e. roughly 
two thousand kilometres from a capital city), and the original works focused on the repair and 
maintenance of existing track. Labour and equipment had been mobilised and rather than 
requesting new tenders from additional contractors to undertake the additional works, it was 
decided to let the contract to the existing contractor to save time. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of cost differences between the OCV and FCV 
 
Interestingly no rework was reported, however, it may not have been formally documented and 
reported, as management within the contracting organisation was generally disparaging of NCRs 
being raised as considered them to reflect poorly on their operations and business. While 
PDQDJHPHQW¶s view was widely known amongst staff, not all project managers adhered to this 
position and refrained from the non-reporting of NCRs.   
 
The mean cost percentage for margin, rework and change-orders by client type and project size 
are displayed in Figure 2. It can be seen in Table 3 that projects less than $50 millions formed 
77.5% of the sample, which is also comparable with Love et al. (2017a). The mean margins of 
contractors do not appear to significantly vary and fluctuate between 6% and 9% of OCV, but in 
the case of the private-sector it is lower for those projects that range between $101 to $150 millions. 
From Figure 3 the differences in mean rework costs can be observed. But, the most pronounced 
variance occurs between private and public sectors projects valued between $101 to $150 millions 
where figures of 0.68% and 0.07% are presented, respectively. 
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Explicitly, it can be seen that private-sector clients in this sample of projects experienced less 
change-orders leading to reductions in the OCV than the public sector, especially for those less 
than $50 millions where a mean reduction of 138.20% was recorded.  Overall, however, a median 
reduction of 0.28% was experienced for the combined types of client (Table 3). 
 
Two rail projects delivered for a public-sector client were responsible for the substantial mean 
reductions in scope that are presented in Figure 2. These ranged from $101 to $150 millions (Figure 
2), and were procured using a design and construct contract. While there was a decrease in the 
scope of works, rework was found to have been reported only in one project, which was 0.04% of 
OCV. Considering the prevalence of rework, particularly in infrastructure projects such as rail 
(Love et al., 2018c), it is surprising that no NCRs were reported and documented. Though, the 
underlying rationale for the non-reporting of NCRs was outside the scope of this study.  
 
The mean cost difference and rework cost by client, contract and project type are presented in 
Figure 3. For private sector clients, a mean cost increase of 266.32% was identified, which was 
predominately incurred in building projects. The cost increases were primarily attributable to 
rework, particularly in the design and construct projects where a mean of 1.28% of OCV was 
computed.  In Figure 4, a service contract for track inspection and maintenance for a private-sector 
rail project had the highest margin of 32.33% of its OCV whereas the lowest mean was 5.25% for 
a design and construct contract for a public-sector client. The mean margins applied to building 
projects were higher for public sector clients at 22.82%. Two defence projects had been allocated 
margins of 26% and 32% and two new hospitals with figures of 23% and 29%.  Changes in scope 
leading to reductions in workload outweighed those leading to additional works. Contractors 
typically benefit financially from undertaking change-orders, but this was not the case for 
organisation in this study. It can be seen that public sector clients were prone to requesting changes 
to the scope of work. However, change-orders requiring a reduction in works tended to occur in 
infrastructure projects such as rail and water. 
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(a) Client type and margin (b) Client type and rework (c) Client type and change-orders 
 
Figure 2. Mean costs by client  type and project size
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Table 3. Project size descriptive statistics as a percentage of OCV 
 
Factors Cost difference %  Rework %  Change-order %  Margin %  
Project Size N Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
< $50m 76 98.41 3.34 508.82 0.40 0.015 1.50 -48.61 0.28 312.71 7.24 7.38 6.86 
$51 - $100m 10 14.28 9.50 12.54 0.19 0.13 0.16 5.99 0.76 11.97 8.29 8.51 3.38 
$101-$150m 8 22.88 16.28 23.34 0.62 0.53 0.72 -1.61 0.45 7.88 10.36 9.53 5.62 
$151-$200m 2 74.67 74.67 103.23 0.20 0.20 0.07 -0.14 -0.14 - 7.20 7.20 3.86 
> $200m 2 5.51 5.51 7.79 0.21 0.21 0.06 0.20 0.20 - 5.51 5.51 7.79 
Total 98 81.28 4.36 448.82 0.39 0.04 1.34 -35.73 0.38 270.41 7.56 8.00 6.43 
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Differences and Associations Between Cost Factors 
Considering the differences shown in Figures 3 and 4 regarding the mean costs between client and 
project characteristics, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was undertaken to determine if 
a statistical difference existed. Table 4 presents a summary of the ANOVA results and the 
following significant differences were found: (1) project type and change-orders (F (62,4) = 6.21, 
p < 0.05); (2) project size and rework (F (42, 55) = 0.000, p < 0.05); and (3) project size and cost 
difference (F (63,34) =1.867, p < 0.05).  
 
While significant differences are identified in Table 4, context again needs to be given as there is 
a danger of falling foul to issues surrounding the use of P-value of 0.05 and accepting the results 
presented at face value. Indeed, the significant results should be treated cautiously as there has 
been an over-reliance on a P-value of 0.05, which cannot determine whether a hypothesis is true 
or if the results are important. A P-value simply signifies that if the null hypothesis is true, and all 
other assumptions made are valid, then there is a 5% chance of randomly obtaining a result at least 
as extreme as the one observed. Hence, a P-value threshold cannot really indicate the importance 
of a finding. The extreme values need to be taken into account and thus should not be discounted. 
 
An understanding of why they occurred enables the establishment of a context and the ability to 
make sense of the findings. In this instance, two infrastructure projects with a contract value less 
than $50 millions experienced rework costs between 2% and 4% of their projects¶ 2&9 DQG
another valued at $101 millions. Addendums to contract values as a result of changes in scope led 
to revised contract values. 
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(a) Mean cost difference by contract type 
 
(b) Mean cost difference by project type 
 
(c) Mean rework cost by contract type (d) Mean rework cost by project type 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean cost difference and rework for contract and project type 
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(a) Mean margin by contract type (b) Mean margin by project type 
 
 
 
(c) Mean change-order by contract type (d) Mean change-order by project type 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean change-order and margin for contract and project type 
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Table 4.  One-way ANOVA results 
 
Factor Cost difference  Rework  Change-order  Margin  
Client type F (64, 33) = 
1.066, p < 0.05 
F (42,55) = 
0.111, p < 0.05 
F (62,4) = 
0.837, p < 0.05 
F (64, 33) = 
0.45, p < 0.05 
Project type F (63, 34) = 
0.869, p < 0.05 
F (42,55) = 
1.261, p < 0.05 
F (62,4) =  
6.21, p < 0.05 * 
F (64, 33) = 
0.745, p < 0.05 
Contract type F (42,55) =  
1.506, p < 0.05 
F (42,55) = 
1.486, p < 0.05 
F (62,4) =  
0.055, p < 0.05 
F (62,4) =  
0.283, p < 0.05 
Project size F (63,34) = 
1.867, p < 0.05* 
F (42, 55) = 
0.000, p < 0.05* 
F (62,4) = 
6.187, p < 0.05 
F (63, 34) = 
0.025, p < 0.05 
 
* Significant differences 
 
The rework costs reported based on OCV may, therefore, have been artificially inflated. In one 
particular project, a value of 12.32% for rework was reported, but taking into account the 
addendum that was added, it should have been noted as being 0.35%. Without an understanding 
of the context of these figures, which is the bane of most previous studies in this area, such reported 
rework figures may be taken out of context. No definitive explanation can be provided as to why 
rework would vary by project size, especially as previous research has demonstrated this is not the 
case (Love and Sing, 2013). In this instance, the significant ANOVA findings that are presented 
should be considered with some skepticism. Correlations are used to further explore associations 
that may exist between the variables used in this study (Table 5). 
 
Table 5 identifies that client and project types had a significant negative association (p <0.01). 
Referring to Figure 3, it is explicit that the margins applied to private sector clients were lower 
than their public-sector counterparts. Juxtaposed with observations presented in Figure 3 and 
correlations, it is assumed that the contractor may have lowered their margin for private sector 
clients and specific project types. 
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Table 5. Bi-variate correlations between project characteristics and cost factors 
 
Factors Client type 
Project 
type 
Contract 
type 
Project 
size 
 Cost 
difference 
% 
Margin 
% 
Rework 
%  
Change-
order %  
Client type 1 
       
Project type 0.168 1 
      
Contract type 
-0.102 0.018 1 
     
Project size 
-0.145 -0.174 0.046 1 
    
Cost difference % 
-0.018 -0.111 -0.056 -0.059 1 
   
Margin % 
-.199* -.272** .398** 0.053 -0.132 1 
  
Rework %  
-0.152 -0.121 -0.078 -0.008 .662** -0.005 1 
 
Change-order %  
-0.127 0.78 0.128 0.112 -0.107 0.56 0.218 1 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed). 
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Predictors of Cost Performance 
To determine if project characteristics and cost factors were predictors of cost performance a 
forward stepwise regression was performed. Factors such as client, project and contract types, 
size and margin were not identified as being predictors of cost performance. But, rework was 
LGHQWLILHGDVEHLQJDVLJQLILFDQWSUHGLFWRUDFFRXQWLQJIRULQWKHYDULDQFHRIDSURMHFW¶VFRVW
performance R2 = 0.43, F (1,96) = 74.880, p < 0.01. Figure 5 presents a scatter-plot of the 
relationship between cost difference and rework. Both ANOVAs and regression results are 
highly sensitive to outliers and therefore the latter are often deleted from analyses. However, 
in this case, they are considered to have occurred due to random variation and it was therefore 
considered appropriate for them to remain (Rousseuw and Hubert, 2011).  
 
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot of rework and cost difference 
 
The distribution of rework costs is presented in Figure 6. It can be seen that rework does not 
follow a Normal distribution. If a construction organisation was to predict the likelihood of 
rework arising a priori, then the probability distribution that best describes their behaviour is 
needed. 
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Figure 6. Distribution of rework costs 
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ZDVUHYHDOHGWREH7KH.6WHVWUHYHDOHGD'VWDWLVWLFRIZLWKD3YDOXHRI
%RWKWKHJRRGQHVVRIILWWHVWVDFFHSWHGWKH+IRUWKHGLVWULEXWLRQRIUHZRUNFRVWV7KH
GRPDLQRID%HWDGLVWULEXWLRQFDQEHYLHZHGDVDSUREDELOLW\DQGFDQEHXVHGWRGHVFULEHWKH
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The cumulative density function (CDF) is expressed as: 
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%LVWKH%HWD)XQFWLRQDQG,]LVWKH5HJXODULVHG,QFRPSOHWH%HWD)XQFWLRQ 
 
,Q WKLV FDVH WKH SDUDPHWHUV RI WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ DUH Į1=0. Į2=1.8815, a=6.3264E-15, 
b=22.008. Using the Beta PDF, the mean and median rework costs probabilities are calculated. 
As the mean and median rework costs are 0.39% and 0.05% of OCV, the probability of 
RFFXUUHQFHLVDQGUHVSHFWLYHO\. 
 
Discussion 
There has been a proclivity for studies examining project cost performance to be based on 
secondary data and questionnaire surveys (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Flyvbjerg and Sunstein, 
2016) or from a public-sector client perspective by examining a litany of their completed 
projects (e.g., Jahren and Ash, 1991; Bhargava et al., 2010; Anastasopoulos et al., 2014; 
Baccarini and Love, 2014; Love et al., 2018a). Seldom has the cost performance of projects 
EHHQHYDOXDWHGIURPDFRQWUDFWRUV¶VWDQGSRLQWObtaining real-data from contractors about their 
costs and margins arising during production is rare due to issues of commercial sensitivity.  
 
In addressing the prevailing research void building upon the work presented in Love et al. 
(2017a), this study aimed to re-examine the nature of cost performance from a contractor¶s 
perspective, with particular reference to change-orders and margin to provide a realistic view 
of what is actually occurring in practice. To reiterate, this study was unable to obtain data for 
WKHFRQWUDFWRU¶VILQDO (i.e. actual and not expected) margin. Rather, rework cost and approved 
subcontractor change orders data were provided, which had not been made available in Love 
et al.¶VVWXG\ (2017a). In Love et al. (2017a), a significant negative association between the 
FRQWUDFWRU¶VILQDOPDUJLQDQGSURMHFWVL]HDQGFRVWSHUIRUPDQFHZDVUHYHDOHGTable 6 compares 
the key findings derived from this research with those presented in Love et al. (2017a). 
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Table 6. Key findings 
Factors 
 
Findings 
(2009 to 2015) 
Love et al. (2017a) 
(2011 to 2014) 
Sample size 
 
98 67 
Total value of projects 
 
$8.5 billion $3.2 billion 
Mean contract value 
 
$87 million $48 million 
Approved client change orders % of the 
total value of work 
 
3.6% 11% 
Approved subcontractor change orders 
% of the total value of work 
 
4.17% - 
Cost performance range from OCV 
 
-0.76% to 3353.89% -42.88% to +270.93% 
Mean cost performance (i.e. difference) 
Median 
 
81.29% 
4.36% 
23.75% 
8.12% 
% of projects experiencing a cost 
increase from OCV 
 
65% 67% 
Mean margin 
Median 
 
7.56% 
8.00% 
9.89% 
9.00% 
Mean final margin as % OCV 
 
- 12.8% 
Mean rework cost as % OCV 
Median 
0.39% 
0.04% 
- 
 
The results presented in Love et al. (2017a) have not been replicated per se, but commonalities 
and additional knowledge have been identified. The margins applied to projects are comparable 
or even almost similar, when the median is taken into account. The projects were constructed 
during a significant period of economic growth in Australia and relative certainty as a result of 
demand for minerals and resources from countries such as India, China, and South-Korea and 
strong population growth. The construction sectors in states such as Northern Territory, 
Queensland, and Western Australia where numerous mega-project developments (e.g., iron ore 
mines and liquefied natural gas plants) and large-scale infrastructure (e.g., hospitals and rail) 
works that had been delivered financially benefited this economic activity. The major resource 
projects are now complete and low economic activity and uncertainty in these states has meant 
that the margins of these may now be significantly lower. Though, New South Wales and 
 27 
Victoria are in the midst of an infrastructure boom so it is suggested that the margins for 
contractors undertaking projects in these states are more robust.   
 
In the United Kingdom (UK), for example, margins have been reported to be as low as 1% in 
2017 compared to those in 2007 when they were approximately 4% (Ernst and Young, 2017).  
According to a survey conducted by Ernst and Young (2017), the margins of contractors in the 
UK are significantly lower than their opposite numbers in Australia where they are between 
4% and 5%. This figure marries somewhat with the median figure of 4.36% reported in this 
study. Contractors have typically maximised their margins through change-orders. However, 
with the public sector facing budget pressures, changes in scope may be used to reduce costs. 
As a consequence, the potential for increasing their margins is lost. Perhaps what should be of 
immediate concern to contractors is the negative impact that rework may have on their 
profitability. If a contractor operates with margins of 1%, ceteris paribus, then this could be 
reduced, on average, by nearly 50% if they do not put in place mechanisms to reduce and 
contain their rework. The danger here is that if the conditions that result in rework occurring 
are not addressed, not only will a FRQWUDFWRU¶V profit, competitiveness and reputation be 
jeopardised but also their survival. Thus, contractors need to build business resilience and 
actively enact and engender strategies to redress rework causation. In actual fact, rework is the 
elephant in the room and it can make or break contractors when faced with a period of economic 
uncertainty. While this is well-known and widely discussed amongst industry practitioners, 
rework remains a zemblanity (i.e. an unpleasant unsurprise) (Love et al., 2018c). 
 
Conclusion 
While there has been a considerable amount of research that has examined the cost performance 
in construction projects, a quagmire exists surrounding what constitutes an overrun. There is 
an overstated perception that cost overruns are a norm. However, cost overruns depend not 
only on the points of reference or the stakeholder point of view that are used to determine their 
occurrence. The research presented in this paper sought to add clarity to this problem by 
replicating previous empirical research and further knowledgeIURPDFRQWUDFWRU¶VYLHZE\
determining the costs from the award of a contract to the issue of practical completion.  
 
In this study, a total of 98 projects constructed by a large contractor with a combined value of 
$8.5 billion were examined to explore the nature and value of rework, margins and change 
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orders. The sample comprised of projects procured by the public and private sectors using an 
array of contract types, with the most popular being construct-only, accounting for 49.5%. Only 
65% of projects experienced a cost increase during their construction, though a mean rework 
cost 0.39% of OCV occurred, which had a negative impact on WKHFRQWUDFWRU¶Voverall margin. 
In addition, the difference between approved client change-orders and those by the contractor 
for subcontractors was 0.5% of the total costs incurred for the sampled projects, which 
DGYHUVHO\ LPSDFWHG WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V SURILW The upshot here was that the contracting 
organisation was subjected to a mean loss in profit of 23% per annum over the period of 
analysis. Being able to provide a quantifiable DGYHUVH LPSDFW RI UHZRUN RQ D FRQWUDFWRUV¶
margin in this instance is a first in the academic literature. However, it is anticipated that margin 
losses may well have been higher as rework was seldom formally documented and reported. 
Future research is therefore required to explore in more detail why and how these costs 
materialise in practice for a contractor. 
 
At this juncture, however, it is appropriate to outline the limitations of the research presented 
in this paper. They need to be made explicit so that future studies can address them and enable 
further developments in knowledge to come to the fore. The sample size was purposively 
sampled and thus the potential for bias emerges. Moreover, the non-probability-based selection 
of projects used in the study means there may not necessarily be representativeness. Being 
cognisant of these limitations, future research needs to focus on obtaining larger samples that 
are randomly selected from several organisations. However, constraints surrounding the 
commercial sensitivity of the type of information that would be required to conduct further 
research with contractors will be a barrier that would need to be addressed. Future cost 
SHUIRUPDQFHUHVHDUFKQHHGVWRHQVXUHFRQWH[WLVXVHGWRH[SODLQµRXWOLHUV¶WRSUHYHQWDODUPLVWV
from unnecessarily reporting cost overruns to suit an agenda that they may be pushing. Apart 
from contractors needing to tackle the rework problem during construction, clients, especially 
from the public sector, need to rethink their front-end project definition processes to mitigate 
changes to their requirements once a contract has commenced. 
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